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ABSTRACT. The term ‘supervenience’ has acquired central status in contemporary
philosophy  in  the  wake  of  Davidson’s  discussion  (1970)  of  mental  e  physical
properties. We want to recover Davidson’s original setting and to tackle the same
problem by an alternative route, which resorts to a phenomenological approach.
The notion of supervenience emerges at the crossroad between three theses: 1) the
background of ontological monism; 2) the interpretation of monism as physicalism;
3) the dependence of mental events on physical events. ‘Supervenience’ bears the
task to express simultaneously the ontological dependence of the mental on the
physical  and  the  apparent  irreducibility  of  the  former  to  the  latter.  In  this
framework,  we  are  going,  first,  to  grant  ontological  monism  while  rejecting
physicalism. We will argue for an ontological framework that acknowledges some
of the reasons of classical idealism, without abandoning a materialist framework.
Secondly, we are going to show why intentional phenomena can never be regarded
as epiphenomena. This move recommends a renewed methodological ‘respect’ for
phenomena,  consistent  with  the  phenomenological  tradition.  Thirdly,  by  re-
interpreting  the  old  notion  of  formal  causality,  we  will  make  room  for  an
understanding of ‘mental causation’ that avoids both dualism and any violation of
the principle of conservation of energy. In conclusion, we are going to argue that
the  reasons  that  originally  motivated  the  introduction  of  ‘supervenience’  are
inconsistent and that, in the theoretical context that we argue for, resorting to the
notion of supervenience is either superfluous or misleading.
The  term  ‘supervenience’,  in  its  contemporary  acceptation,  has  become  a
philosophical term of art since its occurrence in Davidson’s essay on  Mental
Events.1 Here  the  reference  to  supervenience  was  introduced  to  capture  a
specific  intuition:  the  idea  that  mental  properties  may depend on  physical
1 DAVIDSON 1970.
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properties while not being reducible to physical properties. By talking about
mental  properties that ‘supervene’  on physical  properties it  was possible to
give  expression  to  a  form  of  dependence,  which  was  akin  to  causal
dependence, but avoided the reduction of mental properties to physical effects or
causes.
From then onwards, the literature on ‘supervenience’ has considerably grown
and has also become quite technical, in an attempt to find a formulation of
supervenience  that  could  formally  capture  the  kind  of  non-reductive
dependence  that  was  originally  at  stake,  and  its  logical  variants.  Yet,  it  is
dubious whether such a formal direction of inquiry has positively contributed
to clarify the original theoretical problem tackled by Davidson.
The following pages will try to recover the original Davidsonian question and
to  tackle  it  by  a  different  route.  More  precisely,  we  will  re-discuss  the
presuppositions  shared  by  Davidson  (and  others)  when  resorting  to
supervenience, and we will do it by adopting a phenomenological approach.
The  reference  to  phenomenology  is  not  meant  to  suggest  a  historical-
philosophical confrontation. We will make use of some well-known features of
Husserlian phenomenology, but we are not going to enter any subtle exegetic
debate. We will argue that a phenomenological re-discussion of the conceptual
constellation  where  ‘supervenience’  lies  shows  that  the  notion  of
supervenience is essentially superfluous, even if it does signal a crucial problem.
A final caveat about the organization of the argument: in order to effectively
provide such a re-discussion we need to focus on a plurality of momentous
issues, each of which would deserve a more thorough treatment than we are in
a  condition  to  provide  in  the  present  limits.  Therefore,  the  argument  that
follows should be taken more like an edifice,  counting on the support of a
plurality of props, than like a chain, counting on the proven solidity of each of
its links.
1. Davidson’s ‘Anomalous Monism’ and Supervenience
Donald Davidson discusses the relation between the physical and the mental
spheres by resorting to an apparent paradox, derived from the juxtaposition of
three allegedly self-evident principles.  The first one is called by Davidson the
principle of causal interaction and says that «mental events interact causally with
physical  events».2 The  second  one  is  called  the  principle  of  the  nomological
2 DAVIDSON 1970, 208.
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character of causality and states that «events related as cause and effect fall under
strict deterministic laws».3 The third one is the principle of the anomalism of the
mental, which states that «there are no strict deterministic laws on the basis of
which mental events can be predicted and explained».4 At first glance the three
theses  seem mutually incompatible,  since from the first  and the second we
should  draw  the  conclusion  that  mental  events  also  fall  under  strict  laws,
which  contradicts  the  third  thesis.  However,  Davidson  rejects  such
incompatibility by arguing as follows: 
Causality  and  identity  are  relations  between  individual  events  no
matter  how  described.  But  laws  are  linguistic;  and  so  events  can
instantiate laws,  and hence be explained or predicted in the light  of
laws,  only as those events are described in one or another way. The
principle  of  causal  interaction deals  with events  in  extension and is
therefore blind to the mental-physical dichotomy. The principle of the
anomalism  of  the  mental  concerns  events  described  as  mental,  for
events are mental only as described.5
If  should  we  focus  on  a  critical  analysis  of  Davidson’s  argument,  many
theoretical details should be added concerning his characterization of notions
like ‘law’ and ‘language’. But for our purposes we do not need to be concerned
with anything more than a general outline of his thesis, which can be rendered
as follows. In a monistic framework, mental and physical events interact. Events
as such belong to the extensional sphere. Events are the ontological substance
to  which  we  can  give  descriptions  in  physical  or  mental  terms.  At  the
ontological  level,  that  is  at  the level  of  events  per  se,  causal  interactions take
place. On the contrary, the subsumption of events under physical laws and the
bestowal of meaning to them belong to the sphere of descriptions. Therefore,
according to Davidson,  at the ontological  level  we can have event causality
between events which are described as mental or physical, but this does not
imply that mental accounts should or could be subsumed under strict physical
laws.
The  most  debatable  aspect  of  this  vision  emerges  when  Davidson  makes
explicit  the  kind  of  monism  that  he  is  committed  to.  In  agreement  with
mainstream  contemporary  consensus  Davidson  assumes  that  the  only
plausible kind of monism is a physicalistic monism. This implies, as he says,
that at the ontological level all events are physical. But this produces considerable
theoretical  tension,  since  the  attribute  ‘physical’  enters  at  two levels  of  his
3 DAVIDSON 1970, 208.
4 DAVIDSON 1970, 208.
5 DAVIDSON 1970, 215.
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account: at the epistemic level of descriptions, and at the all-comprehensive level
of ontology. On the one hand Davidson is treating physical attributes as features
dependent  on  human  judgment,  on  the  other,  however,  nature  in  itself
(regardless  of  anybody’s  judgment)  is  said  to  be  ‘physical’.  This  duality  is
hardly  transparent.  How  can  Davidson  say  that  his  ontology  of  events  is
expressly ‘physical’ and what is meant by that, if not a judgment that depends
on a bestowal of meaning? 
It is precisely in this troublesome passage that the question of supervenience
comes to our attention: 
Although the position I describe denies there are psychophysical laws,
it  is consistent with the view that mental characteristics are in some
sense  dependent,  or  supervenient,  on  physical  characteristics.  Such
supervenience might be taken to mean that there cannot be two events
alike in all physical respects but differing in some mental respect, or
that an object cannot alter in some mental respect without altering in
some physical respect. Dependence or supervenience of this kind does
not entail reducibility through law or definition.6
Supervenience is here introduced in its intuitive formulation, so that there
cannot be a difference in the mental (supervenient) sphere without a difference
in  the  physical  (subvenient)  sphere.  Although supervenience  is  no  form  of
causality, for Davidson this kind of  dependence is actually rooted in a ‘causal’
ground. Ultimately the supervenient sphere (whatever it may be) depends on
the ontological level where ‘event causality’ takes place. This is the extensional
ground where all ‘causal interactions’ take place even when no ‘causal law’ is
available. 
In the Davidsonian account we find two acceptations of ‘causation’: the first
one concerns  bare events  (expressed by the principle of  causal  interaction),
while the second one concerns the causal laws under which the instantiations
of event causality can be subsumed (captured by the nomological character of
causality). The second one is supposed to support the possibility of reduction of
the mental to the physical, whereas the former one should be neutral on this
point. Thus, in order to clarify sense and possibilities of supervenience we shall
try to deal separately with ‘causation’: 1) from an ontological perspective and 2)
under the prospect of reduction. 
6 DAVIDSON 1970, 214.
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2. Supervenience, Causation, and Monism
In  the  Davidsonian  framework,  and  in  most  of  the  relevant  debates  on
supervenience, supervenient properties are ultimately taken to supervene on
physical matter as ontological basis. Most contemporary discussions assume a
monistic  background as  the  only  ontological  stance  worth  considering,  and
there  ‘monism’  is  usually  a  synonym  of  ‘physicalistic  monism’  (or
‘materialism’).
2.1 The Reasons of Idealism and their Limits
The best argument that can be provided in support of monism, as far as we can
see,  can  be  derived  from  the  aporias  that  its  main  alternative,  Cartesian
dualism, gives rise to. The defining character of substance is autonomy (quod in
se est et per se concipitur). If there were more than a single substance, we would
have only two possibilities: either different substances do not ‘casually’ interact
or they do. If they do not, this would make of them something like parallel
universes: no event pertaining to substance 1 could have effects of any kind on
events concerning substance 2. There could be neither actions nor perceptions
to bridge between substances and consequently,  whatever the ‘substance’ of
our pertinence, we would never be in a condition to know anything about the
other one and our condition would be epistemically and practically equivalent
to monism. 
If on the contrary, we grant that two substances ‘causally’ interact, then it
becomes unclear why we should conceive of them as  independent substances,
since they must necessarily have ‘something in common’, in order to interact.
Thus, if we grant, as Davidson does, that mental and physical events causally
interact, then we have good reasons to conclude that they do it on a monistic
background.
That said, it is appropriate to remind that in historical terms monism took at
least two main embodiments: idealism and materialism. No doubt, idealism is
nowadays rather out of fashion.  In part  idealism has been marginalized for
reasons  that  have  little  to  do  with  decisive  arguments.  For  instance,  since
classical idealism was rather hostile to natural sciences, the historical success of
the latter spelled the decline of the former. Now, let us maintain for a moment
that idealism is a plausible form of monism. We can immediately see that its
application  to  a  notion  like  supervenience  generates  some  remarkable
conceptual metamorphosis. If we take supervenience to be defined, in its most
intuitive  formulation,  by  the  slogan  “no  supervenient  difference  without  a
subvenient difference”, in the context of idealistic monism we could produce
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the following true sentence: “there is no physical difference without a mental
difference”.  This  claim  is  empirically  no  less  plausible  than  the  (more
widespread) inverse one. Indeed, whenever we grasp a physical difference this
naturally  involves  the  occurrence  of  a  mental  difference  in  the  ‘grasping’
(thinking or perceiving) subject.
In  a  materialistic  framework when we mention a  ‘physical  difference’  we
assume that  physical  differences subsist  per se,  regardless of  any subjective
contribution, and therefore regardless of mental events: under these premises
the  mentioned  case  of  ‘idealistic  supervenience’  remains  invisible.  But,  are
there good philosophical reasons for granting that ‘physical differences’ subsist
regardless of subjectivity? In what sense?
One  of  the  basic  arguments  of  idealism is  that  for  anything that  we can
mention or argue for, for any scientific fact and any observational report, at any
level of detail, there is always a subjective (mental) occurrence, and therefore
the  assumption  that  facts,  events,  things,  etc.  subsist  in  the  absence  of
subjectivity would be sheer dogmatism. Yet, there is a questionable conclusion
that  idealistic  monism  used  to  draw  from  that  observation,  that  is,  the
conclusion that Being (reality) must depend for its existence on subjective activity.
This is the core of so-called subjective idealism (Fichte, Berkeley), which is also
the best-known (and the least tenable) of the historical forms of idealism. But
what is wrong with subjective idealism? If we put aside the appeal to cheap
commonsense and mainstream consensus, this point can be settled, as far as we
can see, only from the following perspective.
It is true that for any perceived quality, any meaningful thought, any attribute
of things, etc. something must happen in the sphere of intentional7 acts (mental
events):  there  is  no  perceived  redness  without  the  specific  reactivity  of
eyesight, there is no recognition of truth without a judgment, etc. And in this
sense the set of mental events is at least as vast a set as the set of  physical
attributes (actually, it could be easily shown that it must be more comprehensive).
Nevertheless, this does not imply the ontological priority of intentional acts on
Being. That is, there is no good reason to claim the dependence of Being on
intentional  acts.  This  point  can  be  motivated  on  strictly  phenomenological
grounds.
The first thing to notice is that there is a sphere of experiences, pre-eminently
sensuous  experiences,  where  intentional  contents  manifest  themselves  as
something that does not depend on subjective activity. When we perceive, we
7 From  now  on,  and  throughout  the  text,  we  will  use  the  terms  ‘intentional’  and  ‘intentionality’
exclusively in the phenomenological sense of mental power to mean, represent, stand for and be about
objects, regardless of whether such objects are spatio-temporally existent or not.
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can be  surprised by what occurs and our apprehension of contents appear to
follow  cues  that  are  received and  discovered,  not  produced.  This  is  what  in
Husserlian  language  has  been  labeled  transcendence (Transzendenz).
Transcendence  in this sense is the sphere of what appears to consciousness as
given independently from conscious activity, that is, as being beyond (trans-)
conscious activity.8 Consciousness (mind) manifests itself not just as activity,
but also as reactivity and passivity.9
One could object that this notion of ‘transcendence’ refers just to how things
appear, not to how they truly are. However, in a phenomenological framework,
experience in its most comprehensive sense is appearance, and experience is the
basis of all truthful knowledge. Phenomenological description (under Epoché) is
a description that prima facie refrains from tackling the questions of reality and
causality.  No claim is made about the status (real  or delusional,  original  or
secondary) of the relevant appearances. However, any theory about mind and
matter, cause and effect, reality and illusion must be rooted in an experience
that, necessarily, does not know yet what mind, matter, reality, illusion, etc. are.
Thus, phenomenological description under Epoché gathers and gleans from the
most original source of evidences, on whose basis we can eventually argue for
a specific understanding of reality, causality, truth, etc. Therefore, in order to
defy  evidences  drawn from  a  phenomenology  of  perception,  we  cannot  just
appeal to theories that tell us what reality versus ‘mere apperance’ is: we must
appeal to evidences at the same experiential level.10
Here,  the  notion  of  transcendence  captures  the  phenomenal  ground  that
supports our preference for a materialistic monism. Transcendence signals that
our  primal  experience  involves  a  sphere  of  intentional  acts,  which manifest
themselves as not ‘sovereign’, but as ‘cued’ by a ‘transcendent otherness’. This
is the phenomenon that motivated some strained theoretical contrivances of
subjective idealism, like Fichte’s “unconscious activity of the absolute ego” and
Berkeley’s  reference  to  a  ubiquitous  God’s  activity.  They  appear  as  ad  hoc
arguments to explain away the evidence, disturbing for subjective idealism, of
irreducible transcendence.
2.2 Spinozian Ontology or Physicalism?
However, if we reject subjective idealism, this does not automatically strand us
on the shores of physicalistic materialism. By recognizing the subsistence of a
8 HUA II, 72; HUAMAT VIII, 52.
9 HUAMAT VIII, 42.
10 Phenomena are to be originally apprehended “as what it is presented in being, but also only within
the limits in which it is presented there” HUA III/1, p. 51.
Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy
Vol. 3, n. 2 (2015)
54  Andrea Zhok
transcendent sphere we may be inclined to embrace some form of materialistic
monism, since we are justified in saying that conscious activity is not sovereign
and that there is a transcendent ‘matter’ that can ‘impose itself on us’.  Still,
nothing is said yet about the nature of ‘material properties’. We can say that
there is an independent ‘efficaciousness’11 of events in the world, but we have
little to say about the essence of ontological events. This picture is consistent
with  what  Davidson  argues:  event  causality  is  supposed  to  take  place
regardless of any description of it in mental or physical terms. From this point
of  view  the  Davidsonian  account  seems  to  have  a  Spinozian  flavour:  the
ontological  substance  anonymously  subsists,  while  mental  and  physical
attributes describe the substance without ever exhausting its nature. Yet, such a
vision  would  be  no  more  materialistic  than  idealistic,  and  here  is  where
Spinoza  and  Davidson  part  ways.  According  to  Davidson  the  ontological
substance must also be regarded as physical: all events are physical. And what
about event causality? Does it deserve to be called ‘physical’? On this point
Davidson is less clear than one might wish, but he does share the essential
tenet of physicalism, that is, the idea of the causal closure of the physical world
(if a physical event has a cause, it must be a physical cause). Indeed, his idea
that all events are physical, while not all events are mental, depends precisely
on this assumption: there are many events that affect the mental sphere while
not  being  mental,  and  this  means  that  the  sphere  of  mental  events  is  not
closed,12 whereas  the  sphere  of  physical  events  is  supposed  to  be  causally
closed. 
This is a crucial passage. Actually, saying that the sphere of mental events is
not closed is improper, or at least unclear. If it just means that ‘events happen’
without being initiated or governed by conscious activity, this is undeniable.
We can also grant that there are good reasons to believe that trees are falling in
the wood without anybody perceiving it. But if this approach wants to support
the  pre-philosophical  idea  that  there  is  a  big  world  out  there,  where
consciousness (mind) is bound to occupy a tiny section, this is  a hasty,  and
ultimately untenable, conclusion. It should be superfluous to remind that this
very picture of the big world, within which mind would lie as a minor subset,
is itself a mental event. It is easy to see that conscious activity is limited, and it is
also  easy  to  grant  that  ‘conscious  behaviours’  and  ‘conscious  beings’  are
circumscribed  sets  among  worldly  items,  but  this  has  nothing  to  do  with
11 We  will  use  across  the  article  the  expression  ‘efficaciousness’  to  express  a  minimal  notion  of
‘causality’,  which is  not committed yet  to  any specific  interpretation concerning  how efficacious
relations in nature must unfold (e.g., over time or instantaneously; by contiguity or at a distance;
with perfect uniformity or not, etc.).
12 DAVIDSON 1970, 224.
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detecting  the  ‘borders  of  consciousness’.  Thus,  one  thing  is  to  say  that
something  transcends  conscious  activity,  quite  another  to  say  that  such
‘transcendent  something’  is  the  ‘physical  universe’.  ‘Physical’,  as  much  as
‘mental’ are  predicates in the sense of the Kantian remark that ‘existence (i.e.,
‘transcendent otherness’) is not a predicate’.
2.3 Kim’s Argument of Causal Exclusion 
Now, to  claim that  reality  (i.e.,  Being,  ontological  substance)  is  ‘physical’  is
neither  obvious  nor  easy to  argue.  What  does  here  ‘physical’  mean?  When
physicalists use the term ‘physical’ they do not merely refer to ‘nature’ (physis),
but  to  nature  as  it  is  accounted  for  by  physical  science  (or  at  most  by the
‘natural sciences’ and pre-eminently by physics).
We  can  outline  the  background  of  physicalism  and  its  meaning  by
completing Davidson’s  argument with Jaegwon Kim’s  critical  remarks.  Kim
recalls that the argument for anomalous monism starts from the assumption
that mental events can cause physical events. Thus, let us assume that mental
event M causes physical event P. In the physicalistic framework that Kim shares
with Davidson, we must grant that physical event P must have a physical cause.
This derives from the “principle  of  causal  closure”, according to which «[i]f  a
physical event has a cause at t, then it has a physical cause at t».13 However, if
we grant that event P is caused by physical event P*, and if we remember that,
by hypothesis, P is caused by mental event M, it seems that we have to do with
an instance of overdetermination, where there are two sufficient causes for the
same  event.  But  causal  overdetermination  is  hard  to  grant  except  as  an
occasional  accident.  At  this  point  Kim reminds  us  that  in  the  Davidsonian
picture all  events  are physical  and therefore also all  mental  events  are in a
sense physical. This is precisely the point where supervenience enters the stage:
mental  features ‘supervene’ on physical  features.  But at this  point,  it  seems
natural to draw the conclusion that we do not have separately to do with a
mental and a physical sufficient cause, but that they are one and the same. As
all events are, at their core, physical, all instantiations of event causality must
be  physical  as  well.  According  to  Kim this  is  enough to  show that  mental
events and mental properties may well subsist as descriptions, but without any
causal  power  of  their  own:  they  are  epiphenomenal.  And  this  dispatches
Davidson’s  argument  for  anomalous  monism  by  denying  the  first  of  its
premises: there is no causality from the mental sphere to the physical one.
Kim’s  argument  is  apparently  robust  and  it  certainly  manages  to  expose
13 KIM 2005, 15.
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Davidson’s ambiguous use of ‘physical’. But when it comes to clarify what is
meant  by  ‘physical’,  Kim  does  not  seem  to  fare  better.  He  thinks  that  the
‘physical’  prima  facie  includes  all  entities  and  properties  of  basic  physics.
Secondarily this set must be completed with any entity aggregated out of or
composed by physical  entities,  and any second-order property defined over
physical entities.14 But this ‘definition’ provides just a contingent set of entities,
without explaining what its essential boundaries amount to. This definition of
the physical remains tied to what is contingently part of the historical reality of
‘basic physics’.  This does not seem to be a progress beyond the appeal to a
contingent consensus.
2.4 Papineau’s Definition of the Physical Realm
David Papineau subscribes  to  Kim’s  argument  and tries  to  provide a  more
satisfactory account of what should count as ‘physical’. The gist of the reference
to the physical sphere is the idea of the closure of the physical realm.15 Papineau
observes that current physics cannot be plausibly regarded as complete and
that  no list  of  all  fundamental  forces  and particles  responsible  for  physical
effects  would  provide  anything  like  a  closed  all-embracing  field,16 to  be
opposed to the allegedly open field of mental events. Actually, the problem of
the closure of the physical realm splits into two questions: one concerning the
definition of what is ‘physical’ and the second ensuring that what is physical is
always cause and effect of something ‘physical’. Papineau tackles these points
as follows. He first tries to determine what is ‘physical’ in negative terms, that
is, not by spelling what should essentially belong to anything ‘physical’, but by
defining what should be excluded by it. And secondly, he tries to define the
causal  closure  of  the  physical  realm  with  reference  to  the  principle  of  the
conservation of energy.
The first argument assumes that we could define ‘physical’ anything that is
not identifiable  through  mental  characteristics,  thus,  «we  may  not  know
enough  about  physics  to  know  exactly  what  a  complete  ‘physics’  might
include», but whatever it includes «it will have no ineliminable need for any
distinctively mental categorizations».17
Yet, this is a baffling excogitation, since it should be obvious that more or less
all  of  physics is composed of concepts,  inferences and equations,  which are
precisely “mental categorizations”. Probably Papineau would like to refer just
14 KIM 1997, 294.
15 PAPINEAU 2002, 9.
16 PAPINEAU 2002, 41.
17 PAPINEAU 2002, 41.
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to all entities a parte objecti, regardless of how they are objectified, and then to
exclude from the set all the ‘bearers of psychological features’. But this is in
turn a  semantic distinction between fields that do have an “ineliminable need
for  mental  categorizations”.  This  objection  has  nothing  to  share  with  the
idealistic claim that there is nothing beyond mental categorizations. Nature may
well have transcendent existence but we are nevertheless not in a position to
establish that the features and properties that we attribute to nature (starting
with its subdivision into mental and physical ’regions’) are  independent of the
mind.  Natural  distinctions  may  be  empirically  justified,  but  criteria  and
experiences  that  provide  such  justification  are  ineludibly  dependent  on
intentional acts (even if the extent and form of such dependence may remain
unsettled).
If  we come to  the  second argument  by Papineau,  we see  that  the  causal
closure of the physical realm amounts to a vindication of the principle of the
conservation  of  energy.18 There  is  no  doubt  that  this  is  an  authoritative
principle in physics and we have no interest in challenging it, but the point is
whether this principle establishes something like a specific ‘essence of physical
causation’ or not. If the principle of the conservation of energy defined a ‘way
of producing effects’ peculiar to physics, then we would have an interesting
argument in favor of a specifically physicalistic ontology. If the conservation of
energy implied that  natural  causes  must  have ‘such and such’  features,  we
might be forced to drop the claim, for instance, that also desires can truly cause
the motion of limbs. Under these circumstances we should then say that mental
appearances  supervene  on  physical  events,  whereas  true  efficaciousness
belongs only to the latter.
But  the  principle  of  the  conservation of  energy,  regardless  of  its  possible
limits, does not say anything about  how energy can be possibly deployed. In
modern physics there is an updatable list of the forms that energy can take
(gravitational,  electromagnetic,  nuclear,  etc.),  but  essentially  energy  is  just
‘what can perform a work’, and if we find new ways in which work can be
performed, then room is made for new features of energy. Actually, although
there are authors that interpret causality in the light of the idea of a conserved
physical quantity19 there is no orthodox theory of causality in physics. There is,
in  fact,  only  one point  where  the  acceptance  of  the  law of  conservation  of
energy could conflict with the idea of ‘mental causation’: this would happen, if
the spontaneity of mental causation implied the  production of energy ex-nihilo.
But, as we are going to see, this is an unnecessary claim.
18 PAPINEAU 2002, 247-249.
19 FAIR 1979; SALMON 1998; DOWE 2000.
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2.5. First Intermediate Conclusion
The notion of supervenience came forth at the conceptual crossroad between
three theses:
1) A background of ontological monism, such that mental events (or properties)
and material events (or properties) causally interact and belong to the same
‘substance’.
2) The interpretation of monism as  physicalism (or mainstream  naturalism),
which  implies  that  the  one  substance  of  reality  is  ‘physical’  (or  anyway is
properly  qualified  by  the  categories  of  the  science  of  nature)  and  that  all
‘ontological efficaciousness’ develops according to the model of physical laws.
3) The idea of an essential  irreducibility of mental properties and events to
physical descriptions.
Supervenience  was  in  charge to  express  at  the  same time  the  ontological
dependence of the mental from the physical, whose ontological priority was
insured  by  thesis  (2),  and  the  apparent  irreducibility  of  the  mental  to  the
physical, claimed by thesis (3). In Davidson’s terms the supervenience of the
mental was meant to grant mental causation. But Kim’s argument of causal
exclusion is apparently inescapable: if the mental produces real effects, this can
be the  case  only  because  of  its  physical  embodiment;  and symmetrically,  if
there were mental aspects irreducible to their physical embodiment, they could
be nothing but epiphenomena.
However,  we have seen that the reasons that  support  monism are wholly
separate from the ones that lead to physicalism. We have reasons to concede
the transcendent subsistence  of  a  unitary ontological  background where all
efficacious relations take place. But we have no reasons, apart from contingent
cultural congeniality, to accept that this ontological background is ‘physical’.
This means that we might still want to say that mental properties supervene, yet
we are not entitled to say that they supervene on  physical properties: at most
they  supervene  on  transcendent  featureless  Being.  Of  such  Being  we  are
entitled  to  say  just  that  it  has  ‘efficaciousness’  of  some  kind:  it  produces
‘effects’. This implies that we are not bound to acknowledge any specific form
of  causality  (like  the  one that,  according to  Davidson,  is  captured by strict
physical laws) and therefore we are not forced to the dilemma either to reduce
‘mental  efficaciousness’  to ‘physical’  (efficient)  causality or to accept  mental
epiphenomenalism.
Still, the notion of the supervenience of the mental sphere on the physical one
is also an attempt to deal with an intuition, the empirical justification of which
is  vast  and growing.  Nobody doubts  that  drinking a  coffee  wakes  you up,
taking a sleeping pill makes you somnolent, being hammered on a toe makes
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you hurt,  etc.  And the  more  our  neurophysiological  knowledge grows,  the
more we learn how such and such material causes can induce specific mental
states. Since in all these cases we can describe the relevant causes in physical
terms,  the  question  concerning  how  the  elicited  mental  events  are  to  be
interpreted at an ontological level is compelling.
3. Supervenience, Reduction and Epiphenomenalism
As we saw, supervenience emerged in contemporary debate as a philosophical
term of art in order to make room for a form of non-reductive dependence of the
mental on the physical. The issue of reductionism is one of the most debated in
20th  Century  philosophical  landscape  and  we  cannot  try  here  any
comprehensive discussion of this theme. Thus, we shall keep our discussion
close to what is strictly relevant to the present issue.
3.1. Can Kim’s ‘Functional Reduction’ Yield a ‘Conceptual Reduction’?
Reductionism  is  a  thesis  that  can  be  discussed  from  a  methodological,
ontological or epistemic perspective. Classical reductionism20 was an attempt to
give  epistemic  plausibility  to  the  assumption  of  a  physicalistic  ontology.
Among the various criticisms that have been raised against Nagelian reduction,
we want to mention just  the one that  Jaegwon Kim, himself  a  reductionist,
reports.  According to Kim, the classical model of reduction suffers from the
fact that bridge laws, i.e. the laws that should enable to reduce the vocabulary
of a theory T1 to the vocabulary of a second more comprehensive theory T2,
are  merely  inductive  (contingent)  connections.21 In  this  sense  Nagelian
reductionism  did  not  yield  any  ‘conceptual  reduction’,  where  the  truthful
conceptual  content  of  the reduced theory is  comprehended in the reducing
theory.22 The point that this remark makes explicit is that the core aspiration of
reductionism  was  to  show  that  in  the  end  all  true  theories  should  be
conceptually  homogeneous.  All  true  theories  should  be  translatable  into  the
dominant  language  of  the  most  basic  and  foundational  theory,  which  was
supposed to  be  ‘physics’.  But  Nagelian reduction only  manages  to  produce
nomological ties between terms, that is: there is no translation of the meanings
of the theory to be reduced (T1) to the reducing one (T2), but an equivalence is
20 NAGEL 1961.
21 KIM 2006, 194-195; 1992, 125-126.
22 Cf. KIM 1999, 7-8.
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established only in the form of empirical correlations between events referred
to by terms in T1 and T2 respectively. So, if pain and the excitation of C-fibers
co-occur, we might be entitled to reduce pain to the excitation of C-fibers, even
if  many  meaningful  features  of  pain  are  missing  in  the  concomitant
neurophysiological description.
Kim  believes,  however,  that  this  problem  of  classical  reduction  can  be
overcome. In this regard, he illustrates an alternative model of reduction called
‘functional reduction’.
If we take B to be a domain of properties (phenomena, fact, events, etc.) that
serves as the reduction base, while E is a property to be reduced:
The reduction of property E to B involves three steps: 
Step 1: E must be functionalized – that is, E must be construed, or reconstrued,
as  a  property  defined  by  its  causal/nomic  relations  to  other  properties,
specifically properties in the reduction base B. (…) 
Step 2: Find realizers of E in B. If the reduction, or reductive explanation, of a
particular  instance  of  E  in  a  given  system  is  wanted,  find  the  particular
realizing property P in virtue of which E is instantiated on this occasion in this
system;
Step 3:  Find a theory (at  the level  of  B)  that  explains  how realizers  of  E
perform the causal task that is constitutive of E (i.e., the causal role specified in
Step  1).  Such  a  theory  may  also  explain  other  significant  causal/nomic
relations in which E plays a role.23
We must  recall  that  classical  reductionism  entered  in  crisis,  among other
things,  under  the  functionalist  challenge  that  the  same  property  can  be
implemented  by  a  multiplicity  of  different  substrates.  Kim’s  account  of
functional  reduction  grants  that  properties  can  be  multiply  realised,  and
requires, in order for reduction to take place, just to redefine in  causal terms
(operant at the level of base properties) the property to be reduced. The level of
base properties is for Kim the physical level. Once the property has been thus
functionalised, we should search for appropriate realisers at the physical level.
Finally, the connection between the causal functionalisation and the discovered
realisers should be supported by an appropriate theory that “explains how” the
realisers perform the causal task defined by the proposed functionalisation.
23 KIM 1999, 10-11.
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One of Kim’s favourite examples of functional reduction is the reduction of
genes to DNA: firstly, “genes” are defined in terms of their causal power to
reproduce phenotypic traits across generations; secondly, the causal efficacy of
DNA in carrying those traits from one generation to the following is discovered
in the realm of physical properties; and finally, «we have a theory that explains
just  how  the  DNA  molecule  is  able  to  perform  this  causal  work».24 This
procedure is supposed to reduce the apparent heterogeneity between second-
order  properties  (like  “gene”)  and  first-order  properties  (the  physical
instantiations  of  deoxyribonucleic  acid).  This  kind of  heterogeneity  had not
been  really  reconciled  by  classical  reductionism,  because  of  the  merely
inductive character of bridge-laws, whereas functional reduction is supposed
to provide a  theoretical bridge that  explains how the macroscopic property of
reproducing phenotypic traits in reality is (identical with) a physicochemical
property of a nucleic acid.
If  Kim’s  functional  reduction  turned  out  to  be  tenable,  we  could  get  a
reduction  of  all  general  properties  (functions)25,  among  which  mental
properties,  to  physical  properties,  and  more  specifically  we  could  have  a
reduction  of  the  efficaciousness  of  the  mental  properties  to  the  kind  of
causality  that  we  are  supposed  to  meet  at  the  physical  level.  The  latter
conclusion  amounts  to  the  result  that  whenever  a  mental  property  seems
irreducible to physical properties it is bound to be an epiphenomenon.
3.2 Can Intentionality be Reduced to Extensionality?
Now, let us tackle each of Kim’s claims.
First, is it truly plausible that Kim’s account manages to reduce functions26
(‘essences’, ‘meanings’) to particular physical concretions? Functional reduction
states that if we recognise that property P is essentially characterised by causal
power C and if we discover a physical substrate S to which C can be attributed,
then we can posit P = S. 
24 KIM 1999, 10.
25 I  regard in  this  context  general  properties  and  functions  as  synonyms.  I  take  properties  to  be
defined by their ability to bring about effects/outcomes endowed with the same identity; and I take
functions to be defined by the capacity to issue into particular realizations endowed with the same
identity.
26 I take the notion of ‘function’ to be intelligible only as an intentional relation. Functions must be able
to bring about effects/outcomes that preserve a specific identity. In principle we can conceive of the
effects of a cause without any identity to be preserved: they can go freely astray. On the contrary the
realizations of a function are bound by definition to preserve a settled identity. The tie that connects
premises and outcomes of a function must refer to the preservation of a common meaning or essence,
and this is not intelligible without reference to intentionality. (See below, the account of efficient
causality).
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Yet, let us assume that P is “being somniferous”, which translates into: P is
endowed  with  the  causal  power  C  of  producing  sleep.  Then,  if  we  find  a
physical substrate S capable of causing sleep (e.g., Phenobarbital), we should be
entitled  to  say  that  P  =  S,  that  is,  being  somniferous  equates  with
Phenobarbital. But this is clearly incorrect, since there are many other physical
substrates endowed with the same causal power (e.g., Diazepam).27
It  has  been  sometimes  claimed  that  this  difficulty  can  be  overcome  by
equating  “being  somniferous”  with  the  disjunction of  all sleep-inducing
substances  (either  Phenobarbital  or  Diazepam or  Lorazepam,  etc.).  But  this
equivalence is inacceptable because the property “being somniferous” refers to
infinite possible embodiments of the sleep-inducing power, and never to  finite
actual embodiments.  In  fact,  no  property  (or  function,  or  meaning)  can  be
considered  equivalent  to  a  list,  not  even  an  exhaustive  list,  of  particular
embodiments,  because its  intentional  nature always exceeds any finite set of
concretions (realisations, instances): it is always possible and legitimate to add
a  further  entity  covered  by  the  same intentionality  (i.e.,  realising  the  same
function).
3.3 What is Inherited Through “Causal Inheritance”? 
It seems that the only way in which the ontological gap between the intentional
sphere  of  properties  (functions,  meanings)  and  the  extensional  sphere  of
particular embodiments can be reduced is by denying true ontological status to
the former. This is, indeed, what Kim proposes, by suggesting the ontological
vacuity of functional properties. This point is argued by reference to the so-
called  “causal  inheritance  principle”,  according  to  which  «[i]f  a  functional
property E is instantiated on a given occasion in virtue of one of its realizers, Q,
being instantiated, then the causal powers of this instance of  E  are identical
with the causal powers of this instance of Q».28 The causal inheritance principle
essentially  states  that  all  ontological  efficaciousness  inheres  in  particular
physical realisers and that such efficaciousness is simply ‘inherited’ by higher-
order properties.  In this  sense,  functional  properties and in general  second-
order properties (among which mental properties) are considered void of any
causal  role  different  from  the  causal  powers  of  their  realisers  (first-order
properties,  i.e. physical  properties).  It  goes  without saying that  under these
premises universals, meanings, functions (and mental properties among them)
are not ontologically efficacious, or rather, they have no efficaciousness distinct
27 Cf. BLOCK, 2007, 2.
28 KIM 1999, 16.
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from  the  efficaciousness  of  their  particular  physical  embodiments:  as  Kim
states, the only justifiable role left for functional properties is epistemic, since
they «may play a practically indispensable role in our discourse»,29 but they
have nothing to contribute at the causal level.30
It is clear that the reference to ‘causal inheritance’ is meant to identify a form
of  ‘true  causality’  to  be  separated  from  what  is  only  apparent  causality,
otherwise there would be no point in stressing the ‘identity of causal powers’
throughout the causal process. Thus, we should say, for instance, that physical
causes  ‘remain  exactly  the  same’  when  they  operate  within  a  biological
organism and when they operate outside of an organism. Yet, the question is:
how are we going to decide whether this is truly the case? In order to do so, we
should be in a position to establish what is the true essence of causality at the
level of physical realisers, that is, the essence of ‘physical causality’. But, as we
have  seen,  we  cannot  rely  on  any  obvious  orthodox  notion  of  physical
causation, and, more important, we do not have any ground to limit ontological
efficaciousness to a specific kind of ‘physical causality’, even if we had agreed
on what it  is.  Thus, we are not in a position to claim that instantiations of
apparent non-physical causation inherit ‘nothing more than’ the causal powers
of the physical basis, because we do not know what such powers ultimately
are. We may want to subscribe to the principle of the conservation of energy,
but  this  does  not  entail  any  specific  character  of  efficaciousness:  nothing
beyond ‘energy’ is inherited through ‘causal inheritance’.
3.4 Is There Any Room for ‘Epiphenomenalism’ in a Monistic Ontology?
As  we  saw,  according  to  Kim,  the  conceptual reduction,  required  by  an
accomplished  reductionism,  must  be  able  not  just  to  show  that  physical
realisers perform a functional task, but to  explain how they do it. And how is
that  supposed  to  happen?  With  reference  to  his  favourite  example  of  the
reduction of genes to DNA, Kim states that «we have a theory that explains, at
least in broad but persuasive outlines, how the DNA molecule is able to perform
this causal task»,31 or, in another occasion, that «[w]e presumably have a story at
the  microbiological  level  about  how  DNA  molecules  manage  to  code  and
29 KIM 1999, 17-18.
30 Incidentally,  Kim does not deny that macroproperties can be causally efficacious, or that there are
effects  of  macroproperties,  which  are  not  to  be  straightforwardly found at  the  microlevel.  But,
according to him, macroproperties can be regarded as causally efficacious just because they are
themselves physical or reducible to physical.
31 KIM 1997b, 51; my italics.
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transmit genetic information».32 The vagueness of these expressions is probably
meant as a suggestion that the relevant scientific knowledge is still in progress.
However, Kim’s vague statements unwittingly reveal the weakness of his claim.
Regardless  of  how  closely  we  would  look  at  the  relevant  microbiological
description,  we  would  never  meet  any  spot  where,  so  to  say,  the  causal
sequence  ‘displays  its  interiors’,  showing  its  transformation  from  physical-
chemical  regularity  into  the  ‘function  to  intergenerationally  transmit
phenotypic traits’. If at a certain level of detail we have regular connections of
physical-chemical events, no increase in the level of  detail  will  upgrade our
description  beyond  physical-chemical  correlations  to  the  ‘reasons  why’  the
relevant function is performed. To expect that a greater detail in the same form
of  causal  description  could  lead  to  a  different  level  of  meaning,  where
functional reasons are at home, is mere wishful thinking. An increase in the
detail of the scientific knowledge of causal relations can be greatly important,
since it provides knowledge of further elements on which we could in principle
intervene to manipulate causal outcomes. But regardless of how detailed this
analysis is, we are never in a position to discover anything like  reasons why
phenomena of a kind generate phenomena of another kind. The fact that life, as
we know it, supervenes on a carbon-based material organisation does not, and
never will, enable us to  deduce the supervenient properties of the living from
the  subvenient  properties  of  carbon  and  the  elements  it  bonds  to.  The
qualifying properties of the living are phenomenal and we have cognitive access
to them by a route that is completely indifferent to any knowledge of the causal
chains that may or may not realize them.
Now, according to Kim, if the way in which mental (intentional) properties
produce their effects cannot be reduced to physical causality, we should accept
that they are  epiphenomena.  But here we stumble into another mystery: what
could  ever  be  an  epiphenomenon  in  a  monistic  ontology?  In  a  monistic
framework even a delusional property is a property that belongs to reality and in
principle we must  account for its  existence.  The possible delusional  aspects
could  just  concern  the  actuality of  the  powers that  we  attribute  to  some
phenomena, but never the existence of phenomena as such. 
This point refers us back to the starting point of phenomenological reflection.
Anything that  prima facie  appears necessarily belongs to Being and can be
never dismissed as irrelevant. Phenomena are Being. Mistakes can be done in
attributing  wrong  causal connections  to  some  phenomena,  but  not  in  the
description of their apparent relations as such. Thus, we can wrongly believe
that  the  experienced  flash causes  the  experienced  thunder;  but  the  distinct
32 KIM 1999, 11; my italics.
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experiences of the flash, the thunder plus the impression of a causal connection
must all have a place in our ontology, and any improvement of our accounts of
their actual connection will have to rely on those primal phenomena.
One could believe  that  granting that  some phenomena may not  have the
causal  powers  that  they appear  to  have is  all  we need  to  dismiss  them as
epiphenomena and to consider them irrelevant. But this is a hasty conclusion.
We may not know, for instance, whether our will, desire, pain, etc. have all the
effects  that  we  attribute  to  them,  but  we  do  know  that  will,  desire,  pain,
meaningfulness, hope, empathy, etc. do have an ontological status, that is, they
have  efficaciousness (at  the  very  least,  we  should  grant  them  the  power  to
mislead us).  Moreover,  we  also  know  that  their  appearance requires  an
explanation and precisely an explanation able to  account for their characteristic
features (the way they feel, the way they regularly connect with such and such
experiences,  etc.).  But,  if  this  is the case,  we also know for certain that any
ontology we may like to devise must possess enough flexibility and power to make
all those phenomena intelligible. This is no negligible claim. This means that we
cannot  expect  that  our  ultimate  ontological  categorisation will  contain  only
contents homogenous with current  physical  language. And actually,  we can
extend this inadequacy to all natural sciences. This straightforwardly leads to
the following conclusion:  no physicalistic (naturalistic) ontology can ever be true,
since it  does not  have the conceptual  resources  to explain the characteristic
traits of will, desire, meaning, expectation, hope, intentionality in general, etc.
We may discover regularities between events described in a physical, chemical,
biological  language  and  events  described  in  mental  terms.  We  may  also
discover a theoretical  model (like evolutionism) that justifies the persistence
over time of mental features. But we cannot make them intelligible by using
only that semantic subset of natural language which is the language of physical
laws, chemical formulas, etc. No ontology can be expressed in a language that
is significantly less rich than a full-fledged natural language.
3.5 Second Intermediate Conclusion
In the previous section we have seen that there is no rational ground to support
the idea that Being is essentially physical and that ontological efficaciousness
must fit a specific model of physical efficient causation. In the present section,
we  have  seen  that  we  cannot  reduce  intentional  relations  (inclusive  of
functions) to extensional ones and that we cannot treat phenomena that are
irreducible  to  naturalistic  language  as  epiphenomena.  All  phenomena
(appearances) have ontological status and any ontological account must take
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seriously  the  phenomenological  respect  for  phenomena  as  such.  The  main
conclusion  that  we have  to  draw from  this  background is  that  there  is  no
chance that a physicalistic (naturalistic) ontology be true: any view of Being
that  claims  to  explain  away  the  qualitative  plurality  of  appearances  is
committed to the subsistence of ontologically empty epiphenomena, which is
just untenable. On the contrary, any tenable ontology must make room for each
nuance of meaning, however slight. It may seem to me that an eclipse signals
Divine wrath, a blooming cherry-tree  vaticinates good luck or a smile of my
beloved one foretastes eternal blessing. And I may be badly wrong about each
of the guessed causal ties. But in any case it must be granted that precisely
those meaningful contents that I entertained, as such, are part of Being, and
that  they must  have an efficaciousness  of their  own (delusions may be less
successful than  sound  scientific  forecasts,  but  they  possess  no  less
efficaciousness). 
Come  to  this  point,  any  talk  of  the  supervenience  of  the  mental  on  the
physical seems unacceptable, because there is no reason to treat the physical
and the mental as pertaining to different levels of Being, respectively a base
level and a peripheral (possibly epiphenomenal) level. 
In  conclusion,  we have  still  to  tackle  the  core  phenomenon that  suggests
supervenience, that is, the  apparent causal dependence of the mental  on the
physical.
4. Supervenience and Causation
4.1 What Do We Mean by 'Consciousness' ('Mind')?
When Davidson was speaking about the mental sphere he equated it with the
psychological sphere. But under such a description it is by definition impossible
to regard the mental as anything more than the attribute of a pretty limited set
of  material  (biological)  entities.  This  is  the  reason  for  making  preferential
reference to the phenomenological notion of consciousness, which rejects any a
priori specific objectification. We should reject the idea that consciousness is
just  a  biological  faculty  of  some  natural  species,  because  this  kind  of
interpretation  discounts  the  nature  of  consciousness.  In  phenomenological
terms consciousness is not a place, nor a thing, nor a container.33 It is rather a
condition of manifestation and an  ordering principle. In phenomenological terms
33 Cf. BROUGH 2008.
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consciousness  cannot  be  reduced to  either  reflective  awareness or  phenomenal
consciousness;  and  a  fortiori  consciousness  cannot  be  reduced  to  alleged
conscious behavior.
What  is  manifest  (‘conscious’)  to  consciousness  is  always  only  a  tiny
emergent section of a thread whose articulations are as vast as our embodied
life  and  all  its  settled  experiences.  We  can  bring  to  light  this  thread  only
through a careful descriptive and reflective process, which shows that there is
remarkably  more  to  consciousness  than  what  is  occasionally  present  in
consciousness.  By  investigating  the  ‘contents’  of  consciousness  we  meet
continuous  processes  of  co-ordination  between  our  sentient  body  and  its
environment. We may not be aware of breathing, but we have tacit expectations
(protentions)  relative  to  it  and  we  can  modulate  the  rhythm  of  breathing
according to tasks, emotions, etc. We may not be aware of how we co-ordinate
distance and dimensions of perspectival objects, but we have learned to do it
and, if needed, we can learn to correct it. One of the best-known contributions
of  phenomenological  tradition  is  the  recognition  that  consciousness  is
constitutively  intentional and  embodied;  therefore,  it  cannot  be  fruitfully
discussed  without  taking  into  account  the  activity  and dispositions  of  our
living body (Leib) and the co-ordination with its environment (Umwelt).  This
implies that whenever we talk about consciousness, we mention more than the
object of ordinary ‘psychology’: we name life that issues into intentionality, and
is recapitulated by intentionality.
The reference to consciousness is the reference to the  ubiquity of intentional
relations in ‘the world’. Nothing can be said, referred to, evoked, perceived, felt,
discerned without implying consciousness as a condition of manifestation and
ordering principle.
The idea that we can treat the objective determinations of Being as subjectless
self-standing items is a delusion, and being a rather fashionable delusion, does
not make it less such.
4.2 Phenomenology of Efficient Causes
In Husserlian terms reality can be spelled as spatiotemporal existence (real) or
as temporal existence (reell): physical entities exist in space and time and are
therefore  real,  whereas  all  phenomena exist  in  time and are  therefore  reell.
According to Husserl  the sphere of  spatiotemporal  reality (Realität)  and the
sphere of efficient causality (Kausalität) belong together. Real (real) qualities are
constitutively  causal,  in  the  sense  that  to  know  a  real  X means  to  have
knowledge,  consistent  with  experience,  about  how  X  behaves  when  it  is
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pushed,  pressed,  bent,  heated,  etc.34 The  same could be  claimed about  the
reality of subatomic particles, magnetic fields or anything that we may regard
as spatiotemporally real. This means that all attributes of ‘naturalistic nature’
emerge from the practices, tests, reactions that we deem worth considering. Up
to this point, this position is not dissimilar from the ‘operational realism’ that
we can find, for instance, in Ian Hacking’s Representing and Intervening.35
But this picture must be completed on the reell side. In all interventions and
interferences that bring to light  Realität consciousness is pervasively present.
Consciousness appears as ‘complement’ of whatever transcends consciousness.
Consciousness  is  a  steady  negotiation  with  the  transcendent  sphere.  And
efficient causality turns out to be the prevalent conceptual tool to grasp such a
negotiation.
Thus,  we  must  make  room  for  a  complementary  kind  of  efficaciousness
which is not efficient causality, since there must be a kind of efficaciousness
which  is  able  to  bring  to  light  efficient  causes.  This  is  what  Husserl  calls
‘motivation’.36 Yet, Husserl’s account of the ontological status of motivation is
less explicit than we may wish and we shall try to clarify this point by devoting
a specific analysis to it.
Let us investigate what is involved in our understanding of efficient causality.
At  the  very  least,  efficient  causality  is  a  form  of  efficaciousness which  is
supposed: α) to take place between well-determined events, which also define its
‘direction’;  and β) to follow a  temporal  order according to which antecedents
cause successors.
α) On well-determined events. Efficient causality is meant to take place between
circumscribable events in space and time, which produce effects on separate
circumscribable  events.  When  we  meet  complex  or  ‘fuzzy’  interactions  we
assume them to be the sum of linear interactions connecting well-determined
events. Yet, there is something peculiar in this way to conceive efficaciousness.
To begin with, there is  nothing like a ‘causal  line’  that neatly connects two
events: each effect propagates in an indefinite plurality of ways, which are then
regarded  from  time  to  time  as  ‘side-effects’,  ‘attritions’,  unintended,
uninteresting or unknown implications, etc. Secondarily, no instance of efficient
causation has identity in itself, because it intrinsically has neither beginning nor
end. When we conceive of a specific event as a cause, we give a specific privilege
to it. Such an event becomes the active side in a process where in point of fact
34 HUA IV, 45.
35 HACKING 1983.
36 HUA VI, 222; HUA IV, 132.
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nothing deserves to be objectively considered either active or passive. Indeed,
in the couple ‘cause-effect’, the former plays the role of the agent, while effect is
posited as the passive side. Something can be a cause in this sense only if it is
understood  as  an  irreducible  starting  point,  otherwise  it  would  be  just  an
occurrence  in  an  infinite  formless  chain.  But,  nothing  corresponds  to  an
irreducible origin in natural processes per se. The mere regularity of successions
would never entitle us to say that the antecedent event (A) causes the constantly
associated  follower  (B).  This  becomes  clear  if  we  notice  that  any  constant
succession of two elements could be always alternatively explained by a third
causal  factor  (C)  preceding  both  A  and B  and  producing  them  separately,
without them directly connecting at all.37 From this remark, Von Wright drew
the correct conclusion that causality is unintelligible without reference to the
notion  of  action,  which  is  required  in  order  to  conceive  instances  of
efficaciousness starting from A and directed to B,  beyond mere association.
Causal  sequences  do  not  begin,  do  not  end  and  do  not  go  in  any  single
direction; only if and when events are actively circumscribed by us, origins,
ends and directions may emerge. Moreover, there is no originating event in a
causal sequence also for a second essential reason: ‘objectively’ there is no such
a thing as a circumscribed  event at all. In themselves  events have no specifiable
boundaries, because there is no intrinsic boundary between what happens and what
is caused to happen (in all conceivable forms). There is no way to determine iuxta
propria principia that an event finishes and another one begins. We can and do
determine events, but this is something that can happen only in the wake of
our motivations.
β) On temporal ordering. The Husserlian reflection on time and consciousness
can  provide  a  radical  perspective  from  which  to  interpret  the  meaning  of
temporal ordering in efficient causality. Past and future are no events in the
world, but, according to Husserl (and previously Kant), they are preconditions
for events to be intelligible. The Husserlian analysis primarily tackles the most
fundamental dimension of temporality, that is, temporality as it is immediately
experienced in  perception.  In its  wake emerges the constitution of secondary
temporality (the past and future of which we are reflectively aware).38 As we
know,  the  perceptual  dimension  can  be  never  ‘bypassed’,  because  the
phenomena  of  the  perceptual  sphere  are  the  ones  that  allow  all  theories
(representations) to be formulated and all empirical hypotheses to be tested.
Perception  gives  shape  to  meaningful  entities  only  insofar  as  a  current
37 VON WRIGHT 1971, 73-4.
38 HUA X, 45.
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impression can be read in the wake of the retention of the just flown sequence of
impressions.39 ‘Retention’  names the train  of  impressions that  is  retained in
consciousness  whenever  we  are  engaged  in  intentional  acts  (primarily
perceptual ones, but not only). Retentions are given to  thematic consciousness
(attention)  only secondarily,  by a reflective act,  while  primarily they have a
‘latent’ unfocussed nature. We could never hear a piece of music as a piece of
music  if  our  perception  referred  just  to  the  instantaneous  presence  of  the
sound: retentions allow us to understand a musical note as ‘coming from the
preceding ones’ and this is what confers musical meaning. Yet, retentions are
not  ‘containers’  of  impressions,  since  they also  retain  the  sensuously  empty
intervals  as  such,  with  their  duration and order.  This  happens  not  just  for
acoustic  phenomena,  but  for  all  perceptual  acts,  because  all  perceptual
apprehension  is  essentially  diachronic  (the  currently  visible  surface  of  the
perceived  house  ‘adumbrates’  its  invisible  sides  as  available  for  further
exploration). 
But  retentions  are  not  enough  to  give  shape  to  primal  temporality.  The
picture  must  be  completed  with  the  horizon  of  tacit  expectations,  which
Husserl  calls  ‘protentions’.  Protentions can be brought to evidence by noting
that we may be surprised by some events, even if we did not consciously expect
a different event. In these cases we realize that an immediate tacit expectation
was  latently  at  work.  I  may  not  have  any  thematic  expectation  about  the
solidity of the ground, or the smooth working of my respiration, but I would be
nevertheless surprised if the ground would disappear under my feet, or my
next  breath  failed;  and  this  surprise  shows  that  I  had  qualified  tacit
expectations (protentions) about those situations. (I had them next to countless
further unnoticed protentions).
A superficial reading of Husserl’s pages on inner time-consciousness can lead
to  psychologistic  interpretations  where  retention  and  protention  may  be
interpreted  as  psychological  faculties  (for  instance,  retention  would  be  just
another  name  for  short-term  memory).  This  approach  would  trivialize
Husserl’s analysis, by depriving it of its ontological grip. When Husserl speaks
about the constitution40 of temporality, he is not speaking of mere psychological
39 HUA X, 38.
40 The phenomenological term constitution (Konstitution) does not mean ‘creation’, but a process of
negotiation  between  consciousness  and  transcendence,  which  issues  in  the  bestowal  of  sense
(meaning and order) to the world. The process of constitution is not akin to the sovereign activity of
subjective idealism because at the roots of constitution there is always a passive genesis (HUA XI, 117-
145) and because in the process of constitution the subject itself does not remain untouched (HUA
XV, 283-284, 546). Thus, consciousness relates to its objects as an essential constituting correlation (HUA
IV, 179; HUA VI, 169).
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temporality, while temporality ‘in itself’ would lie somewhere else, untouched
by  consciousness.  Transcendent  events  (changes)  may  well  happen
independently  of  consciousness,  but  the  order of  succession  of  events  is
conceivable only insofar as there is a constituting consciousness (which is  not
identical with a physical brain).
Let us formulate the supposition that there is an intrinsic order of succession in
nature,  which  can  be  recorded by  consciousness,  but  does  not  need  any
consciousness  to  subsist.  Now,  is  there  any  physical  description  that  can
account for the establishment of such an order of succession? Let us think of an
ancient celestial body, like the moon. We believe that its craters are due to the
impact over time of many meteorites. But, in the absence of any interpretive
activity,  in  each  ‘moment’  of  cosmic  unfoldment  the  bygone  succession  of
collisions exists only as a finite present amount of signs or traces left by the
collisions.  And actually  we could not  even mention  signs  and  traces, in  the
absence of an interpreting consciousness. At most we might have something
like a snapshot of the physical state of the meteorite. The surface of the moon
would be like an impressed film where all impressions have taken place on the
same  photogram:  nothing  can  tell  us  what  the  order  of  succession  of  the
impressions was, nor if any succession took place at all. But let us go one step
further.  Let  us  unburden  consciousness  from  the  need  to  produce  a
retrospective theory about craters and meteorites and let us imagine that we
have a faithful footage of the history of the collisions of meteorites. Now, in the
absence  of  any  instantiation  of  consciousness  this  would  be  just  another
present piece of matter (an exposed photographic film, say), which does not
bear the slightest intrinsic reference to any order of succession of events. We
had  just  a  further  piece  of  matter  in  present  existence.  Indeed,  to  become
indicative of an order of succession the film should be  unfolded and perceived,
and this process requires temporal consciousness.
But,  let  us  go a  final  step further.  Let  us  imagine  that  we ourselves  had
personally  perceived  the  natural  history  of  the  moon,  thus,  instead  of  the
surface of the meteorite or the filmed record, we had a present cerebral state: are
there reasons to believe that things would be any different? If our film was no
longer a film, but a physical trace recorded on our cerebral hardware, would it
make any difference? The point is that no physical  description of  a present
amount of matter, whatever its configuration, can be conceived as repository of
an order of succession. Present events can become signs or traces of something
only  if  they  are  taken  up  by  a  living  consciousness.  This  straightforwardly
implies that there is no temporality, as a specific order of succession, in the
absence of  consciousness.  The living present  retains the just  gone events  in
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sight of the coming ones, and expects specific events to come in the wake of the
retained ones: this living process weaves together experiences and constitutes
meaningful units unfolding over time.
Now, we can come back to efficient causality. From what we have just seen we
must  say that  efficient  causality  is  neither  ‘invented’  by consciousness,  nor
passively  ‘found’.  The  efficaciousness  of  nature,  its  spontaneous  power,  its
independent  changes  are  transcendent  instances  and  are  also  features  of
efficient causality. But the articulation in parts (events) of causality, its direction
and its order of succession require a non arbitrary ‘selection’ and ‘synthesis’ by
consciousness,  without  which  the  features  that  pre-eminently  characterize
efficient causality would not subsist. 
This  is  an  essential  point  because  the  traits  of  efficient  causality  that  we
consider incompatible with subjectivity are precisely the ones that appear as
complementary to specific motivations. Efficient causality is one of the main forms
taken by agency’s endeavor to gain power on transcendent reality and govern it. The
cause is conceived always already in sight of its effect. If we tried to conceive of
naturalistic  causes  as  they  are  supposed  to  objectively  be,  that  is,  as  pure
subjectless  self-standing  reality,  they  would  be  devoid  of  any  identity  and
direction  (in  space  and  time),  and  therefore  they  could  never  support
predictions  and rational  laws (among which the laws of  Davidson’s  second
principle).
To  sum up:  the  motivational  dimension  is  absent  from  efficient  causality
precisely because the aim that motivates the identification of efficient causes is
the discovery of  means for an (ideal) agent’s ends. Efficient causality does not
contemplate finality and meaningfulness because finality and meaningfulness
are always already at work in the constitution and use of efficient causes. It is
the most  curious misunderstanding the one that makes us look in vain for
instances of mental causation in the midst of physical relations, without seeing
that  the  very  essence  of  causality  in  nature  is  determined  by  its  role  for
motivated agents.
4.3 On the Efficaciousness of Consciousness
The picture that has begun to emerge is such that the apparent ubiquity of
efficient  causality  in  nature  must  be  complemented  by  the  ubiquity  of
consciousness (not as ‘state of mind’,  but as structural41 condition).  Yet,  this
41 The appropriate  term here  would be ‘transcendental’  rather  than ‘structural’.  Consciousness is  a
transcendental condition of the actual and potential manifestation of all ontological determinations.
But the term ‘transcendental’ is encumbered by a complex and occasionally controversial tradition,
a reference to which may run the risk of being more misleading than illuminating. Therefore we
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thesis  can  be  easily  misinterpreted  and now  it  is  time  to  try  a  conclusive
clarification.
To begin with, let us repeat that we are not saying that consciousness is an
independent source of ontological efficaciousness: this would be tantamount to
dualism.  We  rather  claim  that  monistic  ontological  efficaciousness  has  a
plurality of forms of manifestation, which are poorly captured by the exclusive
reference to efficient causality. Efficient causality is just the most effective form
to organize efficaciousness in order to make it functional for agency.
Secondly, the ubiquity of consciousness in the determinations of nature does
not imply anything like a ‘priority of final causation’. ‘Final causation’, if  by
that we mean the idea that future events are causally efficacious on present
ones, is a spurious notion. We cannot conceive of ends exercising any direct
causal power from the future. Logical paradoxes can be easily produced, if we
assume that the future causally affects the present.42 We are motivated by absent
options, by desired situations, by open possibilities, by the ‘will to survive’, etc.
but whenever such motivations are at work, their efficaciousness is anchored in
a present state of affairs, exactly as efficient causality is. Just, efficient causality
is not what it seems, since it is always intrinsically inhabited by an essential
motivational dimension.
But, if this is the case, how is the peculiar efficaciousness of consciousness to
be conceived? The answer can be set forth in two stages.
4.3.1 Consciousness as Selective Form
The  first  and  most  elementary  level  at  which  the  efficaciousness  of
consciousness  can  be  acknowledged is  as  selective  form  (or  essence).  We  are
entitled to think of such a selective ‘power’ in terms of embodied preferences
(needs,  desires,  etc.),  but  we  should  recall  here  the  extended  sense  of
consciousness that was previously mentioned. On a monistic background we
must take for granted that consciousness belongs to Being. If we keep in mind that
we do not know what  matter ultimately is (i.e.,  what its  properties ultimately
are), we could substitute ‘matter’  for Being and render this point through a
simplified expression like: ‘consciousness inheres in matter’.
But, if this is the case, we cannot think of consciousness as something that
‘acts’  on matter from without,  because consciousness  does not  exist  outside
matter. Activity implies a distance between the agent and what is acted on,
which is  here  impossible.  This  is  why we suggest  to read consciousness  as
selective form:  to be active is originally a  way of being and the ‘selection’ that
have preferred not to rely on such a term throughout the paper.
42 Cf. BLACK 1956.
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consciousness does coincides with what consciousness is.
How could we conceive of consciousness which ‘selects’ within Being? First,
we  must  conceive  of  selection  not  as  an activity,  but  as  something  like  an
essential property. Secondly, such selection is no unilateral power on what is
selected, but must be conceived as a pole of correlation. Thirdly, if we introduce
the temporal dimension, we should conceive of such a selection as something
that manages to persist: an enduring correlation.
All  that  may sound abstract  and cryptic,  but it  may become clearer if  we
envision it in ordinary naturalistic terms. Let us summon a common account of
natural history, and of natural selection in it. Here, it would not sound strange
to describe consciousness as something that emerges in biological life, and life
as something that  emerges  from matter and develops by being selected for
survival. From this perspective, nothing is more straightforward than saying
that consciousness (life) potentially inheres in matter, and that consciousness
(life) exists thanks to selection. 
Yet, some caution is needed. We are probably inclined to think of selection as
something that happens to life. But in a monistic framework we are not entitled
to separate what happens to consciousness (life) from what happens to Being.
What we should say is that selection happens to Being and therefore to life.
Selection is an ontological process that brings to light consciousness (life) and
simultaneously  brings  to  light  the  complementary  reality  (Umwelt)  where
consciousness (life) can exist as an enduring pole of correlation. In the absence
of the selecting/selected principle that we call consciousness (life) we could not
take hold of any point of view in the universe and thus we could not establish
any meaningful unit in the universe. We could never say that a thing has such
and such parts,  a  motion such and such direction,  an event such and such
extension  in  space  and time,  etc.  without  occupying  a  point  of  view  from
which to carve out our descriptions. In the absence of any selective point of
view there literally are no things, no directions, no events (at most, we can say
that ‘in itself’ there is just their ideal detectability).
Thus, consciousness (life) is not to be read as the mere outcome of selection,
but also as the protagonist of selection: it gives shape to (its) reality by giving
shape to itself (and this is something that is done neither by consciousness, nor
to consciousness).
4.3.2 Supervenience Versus Formal Causality
After  this  change  of  perspective,  we  can  tackle  the  issue  of  the  alleged
‘supervenience of the mental on the physical’. In normal action and perception
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(as in Davidson’s first principle) we seem to deal with two alternative causal
directions,  which may be taken to  support  two different  forms of  causality
(efficient, or event causality and mental, or agent causality). Yet, there are cases
where this distinction seems to collapse.
If I am drowsy and sluggish, I may drink a coffee, a tea or even take some
more specific chemical substance, and this may clear my mind, boost my will
and  increase  my  vigilance.  If,  as  Husserl  writes,43 I  ingest  santonin,  my
chromatic  perception  can  be  affected  and  I  may happen  to  see  everything
yellowish (xanthopsia). If I undergo cortical electrostimulation of the occipital
lobe,  I  may happen  to  perceive  phosphenes  or  other  visual  hallucinations.
Examples could be indefinitely multiplied. In all these cases nothing like an
intentional act is in place. Both, perception and action are intentional acts (in
phenomenological  sense),  but  here  we  are  apparently  in  front  of  a  non-
intentional  dependence of  mental  events  from physical  events:  this  kind of
dependence motivated the appeal to supervenience. But after our refusal of the
physicalistic ontology and its replacement with a phenomenologically based
quasi-Spinozian vision, how can we capture such an apparent dependence of
mental states on physical causes?
Let  us  go  back to  Kim’s  exclusion argument  and his  criticism of  ‘mental
causation’. Kim’s argument relied on the idea that there was a specific way of
producing  effects  by  physical  events  (efficient  causality)  and  that  complex
material organizations (like the brain) could just inherit their causes from lower
physical levels (e.g., micro-physics). As we saw, there is no account of ‘physical
causation’ that could exclude reference to intentionality and be preserved at
different levels. The only ‘identity of physical causation’ which may be apt to
be preserved is described by the principle of the conservation of energy.
In order to see how consciousness may have efficaciousness without violating
the conservation of energy, we must first notice that all experience (scientific or
not, under Epoché or not) shows the ubiquitous subsistence of selective thresholds
and discontinuities in efficacious relations. That is, not everything that happens
or changes at a certain level, or in a certain entity, produces proportional events
or  changes  at  another  level,  or  generally  outside  the  relevant  entity.  We
recognise, for instance, that not everything that happens in an atom, or a cell, or
a  planet,  etc.  produces  effects  outside  the  atom,  the  cell,  and  the  planet
respectively.  Indeed,  it  is  precisely  such  kind  of  discontinuity  that  allows
speaking of the threshold between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of the relevant items.
We make experience  of  organisms which  change  physical  constituents  over
time without losing identity;  we detect transitions of energy levels in atoms
43 HUA IV, 63f.
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that  remain  the  same  atoms;  we  identify  molecular  oscillations,  without
molecules  turning  into  different  molecules.  In  a  world  devoid  of  such
discontinuities  each  (putative)  elementary  event  should  fluidly  and
continuously  spread  its  effects  without  boundaries  and  no  entity  endowed
with identity could  appear. Such thresholds could be considered the intuitive
correlate of what physics has fruitfully explored under the category of quanta;
yet,  any physical technicality is here beyond the point.  The core question is
only  that  the  conservation  of  energy  is  perfectly  compatible  with  essential
discontinuities in  the  transmission  of  effects.  This,  in  turn,  implies  possible
asymmetries of causal transmission, whenever a propagating effect comes to a
qualified threshold:  small  changes  that  reach  specific  thresholds  can  spark
macroscopic effects, big changes unable to prime a specific threshold can see
their effects  dissipated.44 This means that,  when we question which specific
changes  are  brought  about  by  other  specific  changes,  the  reference  to  the
conservation of  energy is quite  unhelpful  as to the possibility to define the
nature of determinate effects. Whatever the quantity of energy available in a
precedent stage, it is essential to know what was the  nature  or  essence of the
elements  involved.  Some  changes  within  some  configurations  can  produce
effects that the same changes outside of those configurations cannot, because
there are thresholds that select and modulate already existing effects.45 This point
could be expressed by recovering from the philosophical tradition the notion of
formal causation. Formal causation should not be primarily read as transferral of
physical  quantities,  nor as  succession of  efficient  causes  and passive effects
(although  both  descriptions  are  available):  here  the  kind  of  efficaciousness
simply  depends  on  the  nature  of  the  elements  involved.  If  we  resort  to  the
Aristotelian opposition between formal and material causes, we can say that
the same ontological efficaciousness (or the same amount of energy) is like a
constant material cause that produces different realities according to the ‘form’
that it takes.
How can we then interpret the above mentioned paradigmatic instances of
supervenience? To begin with, when we grant that material interventions on
cerebral matter produce effects in the mental sphere, we should refrain from
thinking of them as causal  determination of mental  contents.  The idea of a
bottom-up causal continuity from physical cause to mental event denies that
44 These phenomenal traits have been focus of interest in recent discussions on emergent properties. 
Processes of amplification, like the ones commonly exploited by cloud chambers or Geiger counters, 
are often mentioned as a key to conceptualise emergence (DEACON 2006; BITBOL 2007). More 
generally, non-linear processes (HARTH 2008, 61), with special reference to positive or negative feedback 
(BICKHARD/CAMPBELL 2000, 342) have been considered natural carriers of emergence.
45 Cf. MURPHY 2006, 227.
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the caused mental event may have a contribution of its own to further causal
developments (no ‘downward mental causation’). But we have to acknowledge
that it is the nature of any specific concretion of Being (things, structures, etc.)
to select the way in which transcendent causes can affect the concretion itself and
simultaneously to select which further effects can be transmitted.
It may well be that technical improvements in neurophysiologic interventions
will increasingly enable us to ‘cheat’ a mind through cerebral changes, and by
that means to induce more and more sophisticated  illusions elaborated by the
mind.  But,  regardless  of  how sophisticated such interventions may be,  they
could  never  be  interpreted  as  causal  reductions  of  the  mind.  Any  such
‘cheating’  presupposes  the  living  spontaneity of  the  ‘cheated’  mind,  which,
insofar as it is a mind,  is motivated  to  deal with the raw matter of ‘bottom-up
effects’, while being irreducible to them.
The essential point here is that not all physical causes operating on the body
(or the brain) can affect the mind as mind. Some physical causes can kill life and
annihilate the mind: they do not issue into mental events. Some other physical
causes (from solar winds to fleeting quarks) do not interfere with the mind and
remain unperceived: they do not issue into mental events either. Some physical
causes can produce ‘interferences’ that cannot be synthesised by the mind, while
being noticed: confusion, tiredness, excitement, etc. may be causally produced
without obtaining the status of intentional object. And finally, some physical
causes  do  become  intentional  objects  positioned  in  the  world:  this  is  pre-
eminently the case of ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ percepts (inclusive of illusions).
5. Conclusion
What we call ‘activity of the mind’ should be primarily read as the selective
and modulating nature of the mind. We must not introduce discussions about
‘mental causation’ starting from what the mind does or can do, but from what
the mind is. If we accept that there is no unitary essence of causation and if we
make room for the intuition that ontological efficaciousness is qualified by the
selective character of ontological thresholds, then we can see why the idea of the
supervenience  of  the  mind  on  matter  is  misleading.  The  mind  qualifies
causation in ways that can be said to be potentially inherent in matter.
Consciousness does not produce any efficaciousness (energy) of its own and
in  this  sense  no  violation  of  the  principles  of  conservation  is  envisaged.
Consciousness  brings  to  light  an  ordered  world  by  having  emerged,  and
existing, as ontological sphere co-ordinated with (part of) the world (Umwelt).
Thus,  we  can  say  that  consciousness  depends  on  ‘matter’,  but  not  that  it
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depends on physical properties (i.e., physical ways of producing effects). This
means  that  when  we  intervene  on  matter  according  to  our  physical
categorization  of  it,  we  may  affect  consciousness,  but  we  do  not  turn  the
essence of consciousness (preference, feeling, spontaneity, etc.) into something
else  (mechanism,  chaos,  meaninglessness,  etc.).  We  can  switch  off
consciousness, we can boost or obstacle the working of consciousness, but we
must rely on its weak and subtle abilities in order to produce ‘mental events’.
At  the  same  time,  such  weak  and  subtle  abilities,  when  they  operate  in
environments  with  which  they  are  well  co-ordinated,  can  have  vast  and
enduring effects.
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